O n September 1, 2008, Medi care eliminated a longstand ing presumption in its payment rules that, since hospitals were doing everything possible to pre vent complications of treatment, taxpayers and patients should pri marily bear the average cost con sequences when complications oc curred. A 2006 law, meant to motivate hospitals to accelerate improvement of patients' safety, constrains hospitals' ability to bill Medicare for a higherpaid diag nosisrelated group when compli cations occur. 1 The constraint applies only to hospitalacquired conditions deemed "reasonably preventable" through the use of evidencebased guidelines. These initially included eight complica tion categories: foreign objects left in the body after surgery, air emboli, infusion of incompatible blood, falls and traumas, catheter associated urinary tract infections, mediastinitis after coronaryartery bypass grafting, certain infusion associated infections, and pressure ulcers. Multiple commercial health plans and state Medicaid plans are following Medicare's lead.
The complications chosen in clude some "never events," the National Quality Forum's label for serious complications that should never occur in a safe hospital. Though the resulting reduction in Medicare payments to hospitals is estimat ed to be less than 0.01% nationally, some hospital leaders have objected to its "meanspirited ness" and to the inclusion of some complications that are not wholly preventable by hospitals. They also noted that the policy did not re duce payments to physicians, even when a physician plays a primary causal role. One prominent hospi tal executive reported ly pound ed on a table at a Capitol Hill meet ing, demanding to know who was responsible for the new law.
Far from backing down, how ever, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) encour aged state Medicaid programs to follow suit and expanded its list later in 2008 to include poor gly cemic control, deepvein throm bosis or pulmonary embolism associated with knee or hip re placement, and certain orthope dic and bariatric surgicalsite in fections. At a December 2008 public "listening session," the CMS listed 18 additional complications it was considering for October 2009. Citing its wish to evaluate the impact of the program to date, the CMS proposed on May 4 that, rather than substantially increase its list, it would add only two ad ditional types of bone fractures to its falls and trauma category. Per haps partially to address objec tions from hospitals about physi cians' lack of accountability, the CMS announced in January 2009 that it would cease all payments, including physician payments, in the case of three egregious surgi cal never events: surgery on the wrong patient, wrong (i.e., unin tended) surgical procedure, and surgery on the wrong side of the body or the wrong body part.
Though it has raised hackles among hospital administrators, the new payment approach is ac tually a relatively small step in a cautious, intermittent, 50year ef fort by payers to stimulate U.S. hospitals and clinicians to accel erate improvement in the quality of care and reductions of wasted spending. After initially emphasiz ing improved affordability, some U.S. payers began, in the 1990s, to create incentives for providing highquality care, including the awarding of bonuses for primary care physicians and the promo tion of centers of excellence for organ transplantation. Stirred by reports from the Institute of Med icine (IOM) that flagged poor clin ical quality and payers' failure to offer incentives for improvement, private payers intensified their efforts. Their incentives now en Though it has raised hackles among hospital administrators, the new payment approach is actually a relatively small step in an effort to stimulate hospitals and clinicians to accelerate improvement in the quality of care and reductions of wasted spending. parency of the health care indus try's performance and providers' accountability for improved per formance. This more cohesive, bi partisan customer voice has boost ed the courage of government players to notch up providers' ac countability, despite the wariness of the health care industry. Second, the terms "never events" and "preventable serious hospital complications" carry a psychological advantage in con gressional deliberations. Nobel Prize-winning research by Kahne man, with Tversky, on "negative framing" and the "availability heuristic" suggests that humans are more strongly inclined to take action when the actions in ques tion are labeled so as to convey the loss avoided rather than the benefit gained and when the con sequences of failing to act are mentally vivid. Never events and hospitalacquired infections score well on both counts. Indeed, Ken neth Kizer, who coined the term "never events" when he led the National Quality Forum, built on his intuition that it carried "an extra psychological charge." (Kizer believes that attention to lan guage's psychological power was key to his success in leading California's smokingcessation ini tiative and rapidly improving the performance of Veterans Affairs hospitals.)
Congressional and state legis lative pressure on health care pro viders to be more accountable for the financial consequences of quality problems (see table) and other sources of clinical ineffi ciency is only going to intensify as more middleincome voters be come uninsured or underinsured. Such pressure will inevitably re quire physicians to learn to sys tematically reengineer clinical work methods in order to reduce errors and waste -a common approach in other complex ser vice and manufacturing sectors. This trend also portends major re vision in physician training, great er collaboration of physicians with systems engineers and other clini cal team members, and the adop tion of electronic information sys tems. How these fundamental changes will be facilitated re mains an unwritten chapter in the advancement of clinical per formance in the United States to a trustworthy level.
For now, physicians should an ticipate more urgent requests from hospitals for cooperation in addressing large shortfalls in im plementing the National Quality Forum's best practices for hospi tal safety. Some of these prac tices require substantial changes in physicians' workflow, such as routine use of procedural check lists and computerized order en try. Postponing such practices, which represents a safety risk for patients, now poses a greater fi nancial risk for hospitals.
